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Introduction

On February 28–March 1, 2003, the University of San Diego Institute
for Law and Philosophy held a conference entitled “Baselines and
Counterfactuals in the Theory of Compensatory Damages: What Do
Compensatory Damages Compensate?” The articles in this collection
emerge from that symposium.
First, Robert Cooter, Herman Selvin Professor of Law at the
University of California at Berkeley, discusses in his article, Hand Rule
Damages for Incompensable Losses, how money cannot compensate for
some losses, as when parents suffer the death of a child. For incompensable
losses, courts should develop a theory and practice of damages from the
way reasonable people respond to the risk of incompensable losses.
Specifically, Cooter argues, courts should apply the Hand rule to find
damages based on the reasonable person’s point of indifference between
less risk and more expenditure on precaution. Cooter asserts that Hand
rule damages are efficient and fair. Implementing Hand rule damages
would cause a significant increase in damage awards and insurance costs
for some important kinds of accidents.
In Can We Compensate for Incompensable Harms, Dr. Adi Ayal,
member of the Faculty of Law at Bar Ilan University, further develops
some aspects of Cooter’s arguments and critiques others. He focuses on
methodological issues, including the application of behavioral economics
to risk assessment and the difference between lexical preferences and
incomplete ordering. The issues addressed in the legal literature of
compensatory damages, he argues, are explained better by lexical
preferences, a point stressed when he applies the same to Cooter’s
scheme of compensation for risk rather than harm. Dr. Ayal then questions
Cooter’s assumption that risk is always compensable, even when the
actual harm is not.
Richard Craswell, William F. Baxter-Visa International Professor of
Law at Stanford University, surveys various economic or instrumental
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theories of remedies, arguing that the concept of “compensation” plays a
very different role in these theories than it does in theories of corrective
justice. This difference was less apparent during the 1970s, when the
earliest economic theories often suggested that compensatory remedies
would be efficient. But more recent economic theories have identified a
number of reasons why efficient remedies might be either greater or less
than compensatory damages.
More fundamentally, Craswell argues that corrective justice theories
often begin by taking it as a premise or axiom that remedies should be
compensatory. By contrast, he says, economic theories are concerned
only with the instrumental effects of remedies, without regard to whether
a given remedy qualifies as compensatory. As a result, Craswell asserts
that economic theories have more to say about many practical or secondorder questions, such as the exact quantum of damages that ought to be
awarded in any given case. Those questions cannot plausibly be
addressed by appealing to some abstract definition of “compensation,”
but they may be addressable (in principle, at least) by an instrumental
analysis of a remedy’s effects.
Michael Moore, Professor of Law at the University of Illinois, examines
in his article, For What Must We Pay? Causation and Counterfactual
Baselines, the question of whether we are liable to compensate for harm
that we cause only when our acts “make a difference” in the world,
meaning the kind of negative difference we think of as harmful to others.
In doing so, this article examines a number of legal contexts in which the
“make a difference” principle seems critical in either sustaining or
denying liability. Because the “make a difference” principle is explicitly
counterfactual in nature, and because the dominant theory of factual
causation in the law equates causation with counterfactual dependence,
this article focuses on the counterfactual theory. In the end, Moore
concludes that it is generally causation that is dominant in determining
legal liability, not counterfactual dependence.
In Moore, Causation, Counterfactuals, and Responsibility, Richard
Fumerton, Professor at the University of Iowa, responds to Michael
Moore’s article. According to Fumerton, the employment of counterfactual
tests seems to pervade the law, not only in determining at whose feet to
lay a harm but also, perhaps more importantly, in determining whether
or not someone was harmed in the first place. For that reason, he agrees
completely with Moore that one cannot very well ignore counterfactuals
despite the fact that they resist (for the reasons Moore gives) easy
analysis. While he also agrees with Moore that one cannot analyze
causation employing counterfactuals, he does not agree that causation
gives us “cleaner” breaks that are more useful in assigning responsibility
than do counterfactuals. He argues that one should view facts as the
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relata of causal connection, and that if one does, one faces similar
problems employing both causal and counterfactuals tests in deciding
which among the indefinitely many lawfully relevant antecedent conditions
are relevant to the assignment of responsibility in criminal and civil law.
On either kind of test, one must inevitably rely heavily on pragmatic
considerations to make legally relevant distinctions. Fumerton concludes
by arguing that in an ideal world one would employ neither causal nor
counterfactual tests in assigning criminal and civil responsibility. One
would focus instead on internal properties of actors. This is not,
however, an ideal world, and pragmatic considerations probably argue
against revising our current legal practice.
In his article Harm, History and Counterfactuals, Stephen Perry,
Fiorello La Guardia Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy at
New York University School of Law, examines certain aspects of the
concept of harm. He argues that harm must be understood as a setback
to an interest, and that the determination of whether or not an interest has
been set back requires a comparison between two states of affairs. He
defends this view against a general critique of “comparative” models of
harm that has been advanced by Seana Shiffrin. Perry further argues that
the relevant baseline of comparison for determining whether or not there
has been harm is the status quo ante, meaning the state of affairs that
existed prior to the causal process that led to the allegedly harmful
condition. He defends this “historical worsening” account of harm
against the “counterfactual” account of Joel Feinberg, which claims that
the appropriate baseline of comparison is the state of affairs that would
have obtained had the relevant causal process not occurred. Although all
harms are, according to Perry, setbacks to interests, he argues that not all
setbacks to interests are properly regarded as harms. In defending this
conclusion he distinguishes between “core” or “primary” interests,
which represent fundamental aspects of human well-being, and
“secondary” interests, which are interests defined in terms of core
interests. Thus a person has a core interest in not being physically
injured, and a secondary interest in not being subject to the risk of
physical injury. A setback to the former interest is harm, but according
to Perry, a setback to the latter interest is not. Finally, Perry discusses
the issue of compensation for harm in tort law. He argues that although
harm itself should be understood in terms of an historical worsening,
there is much to be said for the view that compensation for harm should
be determined not historically but counterfactually. There is much to be
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said, in other words, for the view that the quantum of damages should be
determined not by attempting to restore the plaintiff to the status quo
ante, but rather by trying to put him in the position that he would have
been in had the tort not occurred.
In Rethinking Injury and Proximate Cause, Professor John C.P.
Goldberg of Vanderbilt Law School offers a constructive commentary
on Perry’s article, Harm, Counterfactuals, and Compensation. In the
first part of his commentary, Goldberg offers to refine Perry’s account
by suggesting that there is an important distinction to be drawn between
“harm” and “injury.” Using illustrations drawn from tort and contract
law, Goldberg argues that harm, as Perry defines it, should be
understood as a special instance of injury, to be contrasted with other
forms of injury, including rights violations and lost expectancies.
In its second part, Goldberg’s article plays off of Perry’s analysis to
provide a novel interpretation of the proximate cause component of
negligence law. Rejecting standard views that proximate cause serves
only to prevent “excessive” litigation or liability, Goldberg argues that
the doctrine instantiates a general principle of tort law, namely, that a
victim can only recover on a tort claim if she herself has been wronged
by the alleged tortfeasor. Thus, on Goldberg’s reconstruction, by
preventing the attribution of responsibility for fortuitously-caused harms,
proximate cause limits liability to instances in which there is not merely
wrongful conduct by D that causes injury to P, but in addition a
wronging of P by D. This understanding of proximate cause, he maintains,
fits well within a “civil recourse” theory of tort law, and helps explain
away various doctrinal puzzles, such as the thin-skull rule, and the
greater willingness of intentional tort doctrine to impose liability
notwithstanding fortuitous causation.
In What to Compensate? Some Surprisingly Unappreciated Reasons
Why the Problem Is So Hard, Leo Katz, Professor of Law at the
University of Pennsylvania, argues that finding the rightful measure of
compensation involves first finding the right baseline. But baseline
problems, though common throughout law, are remarkably ill-understood.
Rather than solve these problems outright, Katz seeks to get to the
bottom of their multiple roots. The four kinds of cases being considered
are typified by (1) the plaintiff whose leg the defendant tortiously
broke—thus preventing him from getting on the plane that crashed (i.e.,
the "failure to worsen" cases); (2) the plaintiff whose loss of legs due to
the defendant's tortious conduct caused her to give up her career as a
professional athlete—with the result that she is now much happier and
has no regrets about losing her former career (i.e., the "subjective
improvement" cases); (3) the promisee of an enforceable contractual
promise asking to be put in the position he would have been in had the

1094

INTRODUCTION.DOC

[VOL. 40: 1091, 2003]

9/24/2019 9:44 AM

Introduction
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

promise been kept rather than had the promise never been made (i.e, the
contract damage question); (4) the plaintiff who but for defendant's
tortious conduct would not exist, with particular emphasis on the
descendants of slaves who but for slavery would not have existed, and
surely not in the United States.
In Baselines and Compensation, a response to Leo Katz, F.M. Kamm,
Professor at New York University, argues that Katz’s approach to the
failure-to-worsen cases illustrates the conflict between “objective” and
“state-of-mind” theories of liability. While noting that the objective
theory underlies any defense of a counterfactual baseline for damages,
Professor Kamm advances a “cause dependence principle,” which
evaluates a defendant’s state of mind as a causal factor when determining
liability. In response to Katz’s discussion of the raw utility problem,
Kamm argues that differing legal obligations in the “interpersonal” and
“intrapersonal” contexts prevents the type of cycling of legal obligations
discussed by Katz.
In discussing Katz’s analysis of contract expectancy damages, Kamm
argues that problems arise due to the fact that contractual obligations
create rights in future performance as opposed to property rights in the
product of future performance. Finally, in discussing Katz’s view of the
“future generations conundrum,” she presents her own view that creators
owe their creations a certain set of conditions, the “minima,” which may
be used to determine liability to future generations.
Emily Sherwin, Professor of Law at the Cornell Law School, argues in
her article, Compensation and Revenge, that damages described as
compensatory in fact provide not only compensation but also an element of
retaliation for legal wrongs. She then examines the moral status of civil
remedies as an vehicle for revenge.
Kenneth W. Simons, M.L. Sykes Scholar and Professor of Law at Boston
University School of Law, responds to Emily Sherwin’s conception of
tort damages as containing a component of judicially-sanctioned revenge.
In Compensation: Justice or Revenge?, Simons both challenges Sherwin’s
retributivist model and uses some of its propositions to explore his
preferred, nonconsequentialist account of tort doctrine.
According to Simons, a significant impetus for Sherwin’s revenge-based
theory is what she perceives as the failure of the nonconsequentialist
account to explain the way actual compensation practice works. Simons
counters by arguing that the nonconsequentialist model, in fact, has more
positive strength than Sherwin allows. For instance, contrary to Sherwin’s
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restatement of the doctrine, the corrective justice model of tort liability
does require linkage between the victim’s right and the injurer’s duty. This
linkage can explain why tort law entitles victims to compensation not just
from some source or other, but specifically from the wrongful injurer who
caused their losses. It can also explain why a vengeance rationale is not
needed in order to make sense of compensation practice.
After rejecting Sherwin’s revenge theory as the global justification of
tort compensation, Simons next considers whether and how the
retributive impulse informs some discrete areas of the law. In the areas
of pain and suffering, and punitive and hedonic damages, Simons
assesses Sherwin’s arguments and, in some cases, finds them compelling
if incomplete. Finally, Simons follows Sherwin into the phenomenology
of tort litigation and concludes that, while the relevance of revenge to
some aspects of the litigation mechanism is unclear, there is good reason
to believe that the revenge “story” played out in lawsuits is a significant
part of how the legal system understands itself.
In The Grounds and Extent of Legal Responsibility, Richard Wright,
Professor of Law at the Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute
of Technology, puts forth the following argument. The usual academic
solution to the so-called “proximate cause” (extent of legal responsibility)
issue is a single, harm-matches-the-foreseeable-risk (harm-risked) limitation.
This limitation, which has been championed by successive editions of
the Restatement, supposedly implements the morally attractive proposition
that the reasons for creating liability should limit the extent of that
liability.
According to Wright, the harm-risked limitation, however, is based on
a misunderstanding of the grounds of legal responsibility. It thus must
be qualified by numerous exceptions to be even minimally plausible, and
even then it is seriously underinclusive and overinclusive. Moreover, it
has not been accepted by the courts. Instead, courts apply a number of
limitations that are explained and justified by a proper understanding of
the grounds of legal responsibility. The three principal limitations
prevent liability for a tortiously caused harm when (1) the harm almost
certainly would have occurred anyway in the absence of any tortious
conduct or condition, (2) there was a superseding cause of the harm (an
intervening, highly unexpected, but-for cause of the harm), or (3) the
harm did not occur as part of the realization and playing out of one of
the foreseeable risks that made the person’s conduct tortious, before the
hazards created by the realization of that risk had dissipated.
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